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There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of  internal representation.
This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler,
1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met
by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of  the basic premises of  the work
(in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the first
place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering an account (an example
and something close to a definition) of  what we shall term Minimal Robust Representationalism
(MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about this notion. We end
(Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our account, a science (e.g., robot-
ics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.
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0.  INTELLIGENCE &
REPRESENTATION
Contemporary cognitive science, it is fair to say, dis-
plays a deep-seated commitment to a representational
view of  the mind. According to such a view, intelli-
gence is largely a matter of  problem solving, and prob-
lem-solving is carried out via computations defined over
internal representations of  salient real-world structures,
facts and hypotheses. Cognitive science then earns its
status as a special science of  the mind by devoting it-
self  to the distinctive projects of  tracing the transfor-
mations and flow of  these internal encodings and of
understanding the processes that mediate such transi-
tions.
This picture may be dubbed, without malice, the same
old story (SOS). Classic statements of  SOS include, e.g.,
Pylyshyn, 1987; Fodor 1975, 1987. But the same broad
outline applies equally to the bulk of  work in
connectionism and neural networks (Rumelhart,
McClelland, & The PDP Research Group, 1986;
Smolensky, 1988; Elman, 1993; Churchland &
Sejnowski, 1992). Nevertheless, scepticism concerning
SOS is undoubtedly on the rise. In particular, there is a
definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion
of  internal representation itself. Very roughly, the chal-
lenge is to show:
1. That the operative conception of  internal
representation is non-trivial.
2. That identifying certain internal states as repre-
sentations does explanatory work.
3. That such identification is empirically possible.
4. That the kinds of  states so identified figure
deeply in biological cognitionthat they are not
just some tip of the iceberg phenomenon.
This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995;
Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and
elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and
that (importantly) it can be met by arguing from within a
general framework that accepts many of  the basic pre-
mises of  the work (in new robotics and in dynamical
systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the
first place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin
(Section 1) by offering an account (an example and some-
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thing close to a definition) of  what we shall term Mini-
mal Robust Representationalism (MRR). Sections 2 &
3 address some likely worries and questions about this
notion. We end (Section 4) by making explicit the con-
ditions under which, on our account, a science (e.g., ro-
botics) may claim to be addressing cognitive phenom-
ena.
1.  MINIMAL ROBUST
REPRESENTATIONALISM1  (MRR)
Consider the class of  real-world, real-time actions known
as skilled reaching (also known as fast voluntary goal-di-
rected movement). Skilled reaching is the smooth approach
of  an arm and hand system towards some target ob-
ject.2  Success in this class of  actions depends, in part,
upon the brains receiving and responding to a stream
of  proprioceptive feedback, especially when visual feed-
back is not available: feedback concerning the orienta-
tion, position and trajectory of  the arm/hand system as
the movement progresses. There is, however, a widely
appreciated and seemingly insurmountable problem. The
proprioceptive feedback is often (for very fast move-
ments) required, it seems, faster than it is available. For
such feedback to be used to smooth-out fast on-going
reaching activity, it needs to be available before the mini-
mum naturally possible delay has elapsed.3  Yet smooth
reaching happens! How does nature turn the trick?
What we confront is, in fact, an instance of  a quite
general problem faced by many systems involved in the
delicate, real-time control of  distal processes. For many
controllers, it seems, are required to make delicate ad-
justments based on information that is just not avail-
able fast enough to be used to modulate the process.
This occurs in, for example, chemical plants that need
to control an on-going reaction by adding chemicals to
a mix but where waiting for feedback cues to prompt
the process is impossible since, by the time the cues are
received, it would be too late for the chemical infusions
to work. The same situation arises in bio-reactors that
must keep the bio-mass in a tank constant by delicately
altering nutrient inflow, heat and stirring rate (Ungar,
1990).
One solution, sometimes used in industrial settings
such as those just described, is to use an emulator to
provide a kind of  quicker mock feedback for use by the
control system.4  An emulator is just a mechanism (cir-
cuitry, software routine, whatever) that takes as input
information about the starting (or current) state of  a
system (e.g., biomass, temperature, etc.) and about the
control commands that are being issued (e.g., increase
heat by 2 degrees). The emulator then gives as output a
prediction of  the next state of  the system. This predic-
tion takes the form of  a set of  values for the future
feedback that the new state of  the system should yield.
The emulator thus models the target system and gener-
ates a kind of  mock feedback that can be used instead
of  the laggardly feedback from the real system. In the
reaching scenario described earlier, this would involve
the provision of  additional on-board neural circuitry
that takes a copy of  various motor commands as input
and is set up (by learning or design) so as to replicate
the relevant dynamics of  the real bodily system. The
output of  the emulator is thus, in this case, a quick pre-
diction of  the future proprioceptive feedback from the
hand/arm system (Ito, 1984; Kawato et al., 1987;
Wolpert et al., 1995). How is such a prediction achieved?
Consider the real arm during a typical movement. It
exhibits a range of  dynamical behaviors (behaviors that
change over time) including changes to shoulder and
elbow angle, changes in the angular velocity and accel-
eration of  the elbow joint, changes in the angular iner-
tia of  the arm, changes in the agonist and antagonists
torques to the shoulder joint and so on. An emulator
circuit for an arm control system might thus consist
(this is the maximally simple casesee later for com-
plications!) in a simple neural network comprising a
number of  connectionist-style units. Each individual unit
would be devoted to a different one of  the parameters
just discussed and the inter-unit connectivity set up so
as to replicate the interactions and interdependencies
of  the various parameters (e.g., angular inertia rises as
elbow angle decreases). This simple vision is not overly
fanciful. Kawato (1990) trained a neural network to plan
arm trajectories and found, on subsequent analysis, sev-
eral units whose response profiles tracked the evolution
of  very specific physical parameters such as those men-
tioned above. The upshot is thus a mini dynamical sys-
tem in which one unit stands for each parameter, each
unit is able to reproduce the evolution equation of  its
associated parameter, and the inter-unit connectivity
mirrors the physical interdependence between the pa-
rameters.
The provision of  such emulators5  can enhance the
functionality of  a system in a wide variety of  ways. It
allows the system to exploit mock feedback signals avail-
able ahead of  the real-world feedback, and hence al-
lows rapid error-correction and control. It can support
reasonably sensible behavior in the total absence of  real-
world feedback. And it can allow the improvement of
motor skills to continue off-line - the agent can practice
using the emulator model without engaging the real-
world system at all. All these benefits seem visible in
the human case. And damage to the real neural circuitry
plausibly associated with such emulator functions causes
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reaching to become shaky and oscillatory (intention
tremor), as you would expect if  the system is then re-
duced to relying on slow, real-world proprioceptive feed-
back. Moreover, as just indicated, the neural basis of
motor emulation is beginning to be understood. It looks
to implicate circuitry involving the cortico-spinal tract,
the red nucleus, the inferior olive and the contralateral
dentate and cerebellar cortex (Kawato, Furukawa &
Suzuki, 1987; Dean, Mayhew & Langdon, 1994). In this
regard it is interesting to note that neurons in the magno-
cellular red nucleus of  the cat have been found to mimic
the dynamics of specific parameters of cat forelimb
motion (Ghez, 1990; Ghez & Vicario, 1978).
Time, then, to cut to the chase. Our case for a mini-
mal robust representationalism begins with the follow-
ing claim: that analytically traceable instances of  emula-
tor circuitry would constitute the most evolutionary basic
scenario in which it becomes useful to think of  inner
states as full-blooded representations of  extra-neural (in
this case, bodily) states of  affairs. Just what we mean by
a full-blooded representation will become clearer later
on. For now, notice only that an emulator circuit such as
the toy neural model described earlier would surely pro-
vide:
1. A pretty clear case of a system of inner states
and processes whose adaptive functional role is
to stand in for specific extra-neural states of
affairs.
2. A type of  system that allows the precise identifica-
tion of component states and processes with
representational roles (the units each model a
specific physical parameter, and the connection
weights track the physical interdependencies
between parameters).
3. A compelling demonstration of  a case in which
the provision of  an inner model is not an
impediment to real-time success but actually
enhances fluent real-time action.
This last point is aimed at an earlier and influential
argument due to Rodney Brooks (Brooks, 1994)) to the
effect that inner models are a costly information-pro-
cessing bottleneck and an impediment to fluent, real-
time success. The motor emulation case may thus act as
a kind of  bridge between the real-world, real-time, on-
line focus of  recent work in robotics and autonomous
agent theory (Brooks, 1994; Beer, 1995; Agre &
Rosenschein, 1996) and the more traditional Cognitive
Scientific focus on inner models and de-coupled rea-
soning. For it speaks to the question, how did the pro-
cess of  genuinely representing the world (as opposed to
simply interacting with it) ever get started? How did
internal representation (in a strong sense, still to be de-
fined) ever get its foot in the door of  real-world, real-
time cognition? The answer, we speculate, is that world-
modeling got its foothold when nature discovered that
emulator circuitry could improve real-world, real-time
responsiveness. With that circuitry on hand (so to speak)
it probably required only minor cheap modifications to
glean the added benefits available from running the
emulator completely off-line so as to aid planning, sup-
port mental imagery, and so on. Early emulating agents
would then constitute the most minimal case of  what
Dennett calls a Popperian creature  a creature capable
of  some degree of  off-line reasoning and hence able (in
Karl Poppers memorable phrase) to let its hypotheses
die in its stead (Dennett , 1995, p. 375). It would also,
by the by, constitute a phylogenetically basic case of
what Annette Karmiloff-Smith has dubbed representa-
tional re-description the creation of  a new, more
manipulable inner space on top of some basic sensori-
motor routine (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Clark &
Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). In addition, emulators seem to
be a nice, biologically detailed example of  the sort of
disengagement that Brian Cantwell Smith (1996) has
recently argued to be crucial for understanding repre-
sentation.
In presenting emulation as a minimal yet robust case
of  internal representation, we are, we believe, building
on a common and intuitive sense of  what representa-
tion should involve. Consider central and familiar cases
of  external representations, such as Wittgensteins ex-
ample of  the use of  model cars in a courtroom re-con-
struction, or the town planners use of  models and mock-
ups to aid problem-solving and facilitate debate. In all
these cases, the external structures are properly said to
represent absent, distal or counterfactual states of  the real-
world because they are manipulable structures whose
functional role is to vary and interact in ways that di-
rectly correspond to actual or potential variations and
interactions in the real-world arenas of  interest.
Our suggestion is that this is a useful place to situate
one fuzzy but important boundary that distinguishes vari-
ous forms of  adaptive agency (Campbell, 1974). For
some adaptive systems, then, use models (internal and
external) in place of  directly operating upon the world.
Non-cognizers, by contrast, remain trapped in a (poten-
tially very complex and context-variable) web of  closed-
loop interactions with the very aspects of  reality upon
which their survival depends.
One virtue of  this way of  drawing the distinction is
that what gets internally represented and how it gets rep-
resented are left very much up for grabs. For example,
in our toy case, it is noteworthy that the representations
are rather closely tied to the real bio-mechanics of  the
system, that they are egocentric (and indexical in the
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sense of  Agre (1996)), and that they can be effectively
implemented using connectionist-style resources and
analog components (representation and digitality thus
come apart, pace e.g., Stufflebeam (1996)). The toy sys-
tem thus occupies an interesting region of logical space
insofar as it is quite distant from the GOFAI (Good
Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence(Haugeland,
1985)) vision of  central codes, language-like represen-
tations and so on, yet still looks to present a compelling
instance of  a representation-using system.
In sum, our suggestion is that a creature uses full-
blooded internal representations if  and only if  it is pos-
sible to identify within the system specific states and/or
processes whose functional role is to act as de-coupleable
surrogates for specifiable (usually extra-neural) states of
affairs. Motor emulation circuitry, we think, provides a
clear, minimal and evolutionarily plausible case in which
these conditions may be met. In addition, emulator cir-
cuitry helps explain the complex patterns of  connec-
tion and disconnection between agents and the objects
of  their thoughts that, according to Brian Cantwell Smith
(1996), are crucial for understanding the nature of  rep-
resentation itself. It remains, however, to further clarify
the implicit contrast between full-blooded and weaker
notions of  internal representation and to respond to
some likely worries about our approach. This de-bug-
ging exercise is the topic of  the next section, to be con-
ducted in a kind of  question-and -answer format.
2.  DE-BUGGING MINIMAL ROBUST
REPRESENTATIONALISM
Comment: What the emulator circuit does is very
neatbut thats not what I mean by internal represen-
tation.
Response: We agree that it certainly isnt classical,
GOFAI-style representation. But given the ease with
which we can associate quite specific inner activities in
the circuitry with the functional role of  standing in for
specific extra-neural states of  affairs, it seems perverse
to deny that the inner states are acting as representa-
tions. It is, of  course, true that the emulator circuitry
can also and simultaneously be viewed simply as a smaller
dynamical system linked to the one that hooks directly
into the real-world. But thats just as it should be. The
circuitry can also and simultaneously, be viewed as a
mass of  quarks and electrons or as a quantum wave
packet. The question is, which of  these descriptions is
most useful for Cognitive Science?
Comment: But thats just the point. The representa-
tional descriptions arent helpfulthey dont add any-
thing to the understanding you would get by knowing
the dynamics alone.
Response: This is a tricky one, since folks do vary in
what gives them that warm glow of  explanatory satis-
faction. But lets try. We suggest that the representa-
tional glosses reveal something about the relation be-
tween the systems structure and the tasks it is supposed
to perform. If  we ask why a given unit has the response
profile it does, or why unit x is connected to unit y in
just the way it is, then learning that the units are stand-
ing in for the real-world evolution of  two specific arm
motion parameters is surely illuminating. Representa-
tion-talk, in this case, is the glue that binds telos (pur-
pose) to mechanism. Importantly, this binding is achieved
in a way that simultaneously helps explain the physical
characteristics of  the specific target device (the actual
emulator circuit) and that displaysin a necessarily ab-
stract waysomething of  the space of  other possible
devices that could fulfill the same role. Thus the repre-
sentational description helps fix the equivalence class
of dynamical systems that could fill the specific func-
tional role of  enabling smooth real-time reaching in the
absence of  sufficiency fast proprioceptive feedback. This
equivalence class will include circuits that look very dif-
ferent when viewed without the lens of  our representa-
tional understanding and will include e.g., circuits that
use multiple units to code for each parameter, circuits
that use over-lapping populations of  units and coarse
coding, ones that use simple look-up tables, and ones
that exploit more complex dynamical features such as
limit cycles. Considered just as dynamical systems, these
are all very different critters indeed. A representational
gloss, we suggest, helps us isolate the functionally sa-
lient properties in virtue of  which all these circuits are
fit to play the same abstract role in a wider system: a
role defined by reference to what the circuitry is for and
what it helps to achieve. Surely that is why it is exciting
to learn e.g., that certain neurons in the cats magno-
cellular red nucleus mimic the dynamics of  forelimb
motionit is exciting because it is a clue (though only a
clue) to what the neurons are really doing for the sys-
tem.6  Such clues are of  great practical importance as
they influence the way we go on to conduct future re-
search e.g., we look at other circuits quite closely con-
nected to this one and ask what they might be doing
that draws on this kind of  information and so on.
Comment: Even if  there is some heuristic value (to
us) in analyzing the system in representational terms, we
should not be misled into believing that those units (or
whatever) actually represent anything to the system.
Response: This, as it happens, is exactly the kind of
worry that our account is designed to meet. It s a worry
that has recently surfaced in a number of  places. Thus
consider the following comments:
 . . . if  a particular neuron fires . . . whenever
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something red is visible, that neuron. . . may
be said to represent the presence of  some-
thing red. While this argument may be per-
fectly reasonable as an observers explanation
of  the system, it should not be mistaken for
an explanation of  what the agent in question
believes.  (Brooks & Stein,1993, p. 2)
 Computer models of  autonomous agents
contain symbolic structures that represent
theoretical entities to the modeler, while com-
putational theories of  autonomous agents
claim that agents contain symbolic structures
that represent their situation to themselves.
(Beer,1995, p. 175)
At least one of the present writers (Clark) used to
dismiss this kind of comment as trading on the mis-
taken idea that every representation (to be a representa-
tion for the system) needs to be conceptualized as a rep-
resentation by the system: a feat which clearly calls for
very sophisticated reflection and looks likely to bring in
considerations of  conscious awareness, linguistic abili-
ties and so on. Alternatively, it might be thought that all
that is being pointed out is that we should not be too
quick to infer function from correlation. The mere fact
that some inner state correlates with the presence of
red (or whatever) falls well short of  establishing that its
systemic role is that of  red detector see e.g.,
Churchland & Sejnowskis (1992, pp. 185-186) lovely
discussion  of  units that correlate with the presence of
edges but whose systemic role is to extract curvature
from shaded images. Let us assume, however, that we
are not misled about systemic role, and that the critic is
not merely drawing attention to the fact that the system
is unaware of  its own representational activity. In such
a case, is there any further value in distinguishing be-
tween representation-to-us and representation-to-the-
system?
We think that there is, and that what is really at issue
is an important and illuminating contrast between what
we will term (boringly, but descriptively) weak versus
strong senses of  internal representation. Thus consider
an arm control system that must operate without the
benefit of  additional emulator circuitry. The system uses
a mixture of  ballistic early motion and whatever error
corrections can be performed using only the slow, prop-
rioceptive feedback available from the real arm and hand
system itself. Such a system might well involve a num-
ber of  inner states that can be correlated with real-world
events. And these correlations are not accidentalit is
indeed the adaptive role of  these inner states to thus
track and respond to changes in arm orientation. None-
theless none of  these states function as stand-ins for e.g.
arm angle in the strong sense of  playing the part of  arm
angle in such a way that the real-world arm movements
need not themselves participate in various episodes of
control and coordination. The difference is thus between
inner states that continuously link the processing to the
on-going evolution of  extra-neural reality and inner
states that recapitulate the dynamics of extra-neural re-
ality without depending on a constant physical linkage
between the inner states and what they are about. Only
the latter constitute cases of  what we are calling strong
internal representation. The former are states whose
role is not to model the world as such (that is the prov-
ince of  strong representation) but rather to guide our
activities by creating closed loop interactions that yield
adaptively valuable responses keyed to the on-going
evolution of  the physical world as it is impacting upon
our sensory peripheries.
The problematic distinction (between systems that can
be usefully understood, from the outside, in representa-
tional terms and those in which the representations are
actually for the system ) is thus revealed as genuine. For
systems such as the simple, non-emulator based arm
controller may successfully deal with some domains
without needing to create independently manipulable
items capable of standing-in for elements of the do-
main outside the loop of  the systems direct interac-
tions with its world. It is this distinction, we submit,
that has led the more sensitive philosophers of  cogni-
tive science (Haugeland, 1991; Smith, 1996) to tie the
idea of  internal representations to ideas involving track-
ing the distal, the absent, and the non-existent. For such
cases look to require the use of stand-ins in our strong
sense i.e., inner items capable of  playing their roles in
the absence of  the on-going perceptual inputs that or-
dinarily allow us to key our actions to our world.
The upshot is that ordinary controllers (that is, con-
trollers which do not employ emulator circuitry) do not,
in our strong sense, represent the events they control
no more than, to take a mundane example, the sculptors
hand represents the clay it manipulates. We are thus led
to re-invent the distinction between real representational
systems and what Israel (1988) called information and
control systems. These are any systems in which trans-
duced information plays the adaptive role of  promot-
ing successful goal-oriented behavior. Such systems may
indeed be apt for external analysis in terms that describe
such and such a neural population as representing such
and such a state of  affairs. But unless the system dis-
plays, in addition, the capacity to set-up and manipulate
inner models instead of operating directly upon the
world, it will fail to count as a locus of  full-blooded
internal representation. Chess computers that try out
possible moves so as to assign values to options and
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then act on the basis of  such comparisons are thus full-
blooded representers,7  whereas a simple phototropic
(light following) robot is not. Similarly, the tic-tac-toe
network (McClelland et al., 1986) that uses its own play
module to simulate an opponents possible responses
before choosing a move involves a case of  full-blooded
representation, whereas a tic-tac-toe network with a hard-
wired response for every possible move does not.
Comment: The more I think about the real motor
emulation case, the less clear I am on its role in the
argument. Such emulator circuitry seems to be working
just one step ahead of  the real-world feedback. This
falls well short of  an inner model that can be consulted
fully independently of  the systems ongoing interactions
with the world.
Response: This worry was raised, in somewhat dif-
ferent forms, by two anonymous referees. We think it is
a good one, as it allows us to clarify our view of  the
relation between full-blooded internal representation,
minimal robust representation and the weasel word cog-
nition. In Section 1 we now identify full-blooded inter-
nal representations with fully de-coupleable inner surrogates
for extra-neural states of  affairs. The case of  basic mo-
tor emulation does indeed fall short of  meeting this
stricter criterion, and for just the reasons mentioned in
the comment: the surrogate states are not fully-
decoupleable from ongoing environmental input. In-
stead, the surrogates act to provide a kind of  fine tun-
ing for environmentally coupled action. Such cases con-
stitute the most minimal example of  a representational
strategy. In fact, we do not mind how these minimal states
are described. What matters is that the basic strategy of
using inner states to stand in for (in this case tempo-
rarily) absent states of  affairs is here in place. We have
arrived at the most minimal end of  what is surely a rich
continuum of  possible stand-in invoking strategies.
Our claim is that the kind of  circuitry that supports
this basic functionality provides the basis upon which
stronger forms of  internal representation can then de-
velop (hence our speculations concerning the fully off-
line use of  the same emulator loop). An ability to de-
ploy the same circuitry without any actual activity (per-
haps by simply issuing an action command and actively
inhibiting bodily response) then moves us up the repre-
sentational continuum. It allows the emulator-exploit-
ing system to predict the shape of  possible actions much
further ahead (not just one step into the future). At the
top end of  this continuum lie creatures capable of  ma-
nipulating rich inner models of  many possible environ-
ments and actions and capable of using those manipu-
lations to plan ever- more effective and complex courses
of action.
This same continuum-based view applies to the vexed
question of  the cognitive/non- cognitive divide. We
think it is misleading to insist on a neat divide. But there
are genuine differences among adaptive strategies. And
the strategies that allow creatures to best cope with the
distal and the absent are, traditionally, those most strongly
associated with the notion of  a cognizant agent. Now it
is true (as one referee usefully points out) that not even
the sceptic about internal representation means to deny
the obvious fact that human agents can and do think
about the distal and the absent, that we can and do make
plans involving future chains of  events etc. So the mere
presence of  such capacities cannot be the object of  our
theoretical discussion. Instead, we are suggesting that,
as a matter of empirical fact, the capacities most strongly
associated with the traditional notion of cognition will
turn out to be supported (made possible) by the pres-
ence of  robustly representational inner states or pro-
cesses: inner states or processes that are a) scientifically
(non-semantically) identifiable and b) serve as stand-ins
for specific extra-neural states of  affairs. If  no such iden-
tifiable substates or processes are to be found (perhaps
because the system is too unstable, too complex, or too
holistic in operation) then we would have to concede
the anti-representationalist point. And we do, in any case,
anticipate a kind of  continuum effect.
Some adaptive strategies will rely on inner states that
are more strongly representational than others (e.g. full
and free off-line useability of  the stand-ins, versus cases
where the use is more constrained, either to a context or
to a sequence or to a certain depth of  look-ahead). And
some, as we saw, will not involve the use of  stand-ins at
all. Our suggestion is that the cognitive/non-cognitive
divide will turn out to be empirically tied to the pres-
ence or absence of  identifiable systemic stand-ins. The
move towards a cognitive robotics will thus be marked
by an increasing reliance on strategies such as off-line
modeling and emulation.
Does it follow (as one referee suggested)  that it  now
becomes an empirical question whether we humans are
indeed cognitive agents? This would indeed be odd,
though it might become more palatable once it is accepted
that the scientific issue concerns not so much what we
can do (e.g. think about the distal and absent) as how we
can do it. But we need not go so far. Instead, our claim
is that as a matter of fact the capacity to think about the
distal and the absent is grounded in the use of  systemic
stand-ins and emulation-based strategies. In other words,
there could (logically) be non-(strong) representation us-
ing cognizers.8  But biological systems are just not like
that.
It is also worth noting, however, that the use of   such
strategies and stand-ins is meant as a necessary and not
a sufficient condition for the attribution of  a cognitive
competence. So a simple robot that uses off-line world
models may still fail to qualify as a cognitive agent. (There
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may, for example, be additional constraints involving
flexibility and environmental complexity.)
Comment: But isnt this a rather revisionist take on
internal representation?  Popular cognitive scientific
usage seems so much more lax.
Response: There can be no doubt but that the
neuroscientific community, at least, tends to talk of  in-
ternal representation when all that is really at issue are
states of  information and control. By contrast, phi-
losophers (and cognitive scientists concerned with
higher-level reasoning, planning, story-understanding
and so on) have often been guided by something much
more akin to our notion (Haugeland, 1991; Smith, 1996).
We now think that some degree of  revisionism is inevi-
table, and that one of  the more positive lessons of  re-
cent debates about internal representation (such as the
exchange between Vera & Simon and their critics (Vera
& Simon, 1993; Touretsky & Pomerleau, 1994) is that
something really does have to give. For the cognitive scientific
usage of  the term representation is trying to do too
much. It is torn between 1) a notion that is tied to the
idea of  inner states that merit external understanding as
information-bearers (an account that covers sun-track-
ing plants, low level vision and much else besides (Smith,
1996), and 2) a notion tied to the idea of inner states
whose character helps us to distinguish the real cogniz-
ers from the resta distinction that, we claim, involves
identifying systems capable of breaking their cycle of
direct interactions with the world and reasoning outside
the loop . We dont see how (except by oscillation, am-
biguity or self-deception) the term internal representa-
tion can figure in both these projects at once. In opting
for the stronger, model-based reading we must perforce
embrace a degree of  revisionism. What we get to keep
is the idea of  representations as inner surrogates that
allow some animals to engage in the vicarious (hence
safer) exploration of  their worlds (Campbell, 1974).
What we must give up is the idea that all cases of  fea-
ture detection, coordinate transformation, etc. necessarily
involve internal representation in the same sense.
Comment: Even if  the (strong) representational story
helps us to understand what is going on in the emulator
circuit, it is surely not a sufficient explanation. We must
also attend to the real temporal dynamics that allow the
circuit to participate in the real-time control of  motion.
Response: We totally agree. We must indeed face up
to the fact that the effectively atemporal Turing machine
model of  computation leaves out much that is of  inter-
est for understanding biological cognition. It is clear
that, for example, the adaptive value of  the emulator
circuit depends as heavily on the precise real-time pro-
file of  its response as upon the representational roles
of  the units. A satisfying analysis of  the emulator cir-
cuit will thus involve both an understanding of  the rep-
resentational roles of its states and processes and an
account of the real-time circuit dynamics that fit the
temporal profile of  the emulator to the temporally evolv-
ing needs of  the overall system. The detailed under-
standing of  some strongly representational systems may
thus involve flipping back and forth between a tradi-
tional representational approach and something more
like a dynamical systems analysis (Port & van Gelder,
1995).
Comment: Cant any reasonably sophisticated sys-
tem be described as an emulator? And if  so, then doesnt
this render the project of  finding biological emulators a
pointless exercise?
Response: These comments, made by another anony-
mous referee, allow us one final chance to clarify some
crucial points. Actually, the requirements for being an
emulator are rather strict. First, there must be a control
loop of  some sort, such that one part of  the loop is
usefully identified as the controller, and the rest identi-
fied as the controlled system. Examples of  such control
loops are thermostat/room systems, car/driver systems,
and even brain/body systems. Then, there must be some
additional system which can accept a copy of  the con-
trol signal produced by the controller and on that basis
produce a mock version of  the feedback signal that the
controlled system would produce if  it were to process
that same control signal. These requirements are far from
trivial. Not everything is a flight simulator, exactly be-
cause not everything is so constructed so as to take typi-
cal pilot control signals (joystick movements, etc.) and
produce mock versions of  the feedback that a real air-
craft would provide (instrument readings, visual scene,
etc.).
As far as the identification of  biological emulators
goes, presumably one would look for neural pathways
which apparently carry efferent copy information. These
would be neural lines which break off  from normal ef-
ferent lines, and carry copies of  the efferent signal else-
where in the central nervous system for processing. One
would then see to where these efferent copy lines lead,
and see if there is any evidence that what they are doing
is processing these copies to produce mock feedback.
Does damage to these areas compromise fast voluntary
movements (an appropriate question for the sort of
motor emulator discussed in Section 1), or more gener-
ally, does damage to that area produce the sorts of  defi-
cits one would expect if  that area is acting as a neural
stand in of  this or that sort? These questions may not
be easy to answer, and there will often be alternate in-
terpretations of  even the most seemingly straight-for-
ward data (see, e.g., Footnote 6). But this is how it is
with all attempts to identify the function of neural sys-
tems. We address this issue a bit more in the next sec-
tion.
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3.  BURGEONING COMPLEXITY?
Our claim, in a nutshell, is that there is a strong (non-
trivial) sense of  internal representation that is both ex-
planatorily potent and that looks to be quite widely ap-
plicable to real biological systemsthe sense, namely,
of inner states and processes whose functional role re-
ally does involve playing the part of  environmental fea-
tures that need not be in close, constant interaction with
the agent at the time. This notion answers to all the
demands laid out in our opening section save one: the
demand (number 3 on our original list) that we be able
to identify in biological organisms the specific inner
states or processes that play particular representational
roles. Is such identification empirically plausible once
we leave the realm of  toy devices and confront biologi-
cal systems in all their gory complexity? In short we
now confront the most worrying skeptical response of
all: okay, as far as the emulator circuits go, but real brains
just arent like that.
This is a genuine worry and one for which there is, as
yet, no compelling remedy: only time and advances in
neuroscience will tell. Certainly we accept the bare pos-
sibility that biological brains might constitute systems
capable of  de-coupled, off-line modeling yet not prove
susceptible to the kind of  functional de-composition
involved in a representational analysis. This might be
the case if, for example, the inner goings-on are all in-
ter-linked by vast quantities of  reciprocal causal influ-
ence, thus making it impossible to assign specific repre-
sentational roles to identifiable sub-states or processes.
Under such conditions, the most we might say is that
the whole tangled web of  inner resources constitutes a
kind of  miniature dynamical re-construction of  the rel-
evant aspects of  extra-neural reality. But if  we cannot
go on to be more specificif  we cannot also assign
finer-grained representational roles to component states
or processesthen the explanatory value of  the analy-
sis is significantly (perhaps fatally) reduced.
This possibility (discussed at length in Clark, 1997a)
should not depress us unduly. It is, after all, one of  the
recurring demands of  the sceptic about internal repre-
sentation that the notion be unpacked in such a way as
to make clear its empirical commitments. It is thus a
virtue of  our account that it exposes the strong repre-
sentationalist vision to empirical refutation. That said,
it is comforting to reflect that on-going neuroscientific
research looks to reveal something less than the kind of
burgeoning complexity described above: dense recipro-
cal influences are indeed widespread in the brain, but it
still seems possible to identify specific aspects of neu-
ral circuitry with specific representational roleswit-
ness e.g., the work on cells in the cat red nucleus men-
tioned previously. It is also worth remarking that, even
where burgeoning complexity threatens, it is sometimes
possible to find descriptions that allow us to associate
representational roles with higher level systemic features
including dynamical constructs such as limit cycles, po-
tential wells, and attractors formed in the spaces de-
fined by complex coupled systems. In these cases, the
surface appearance of analytically-intractable complex-
ity hides lower-dimensional patterns that may play spe-
cific and identifiable representational roles (Busemeyer
& Townsend, 1995; Clark, 1997b).
Notice, finally, that the bulk of  contemporary anti-
representationalist rhetoric and argument fails to engage
with our position since it focuses heavily on the com-
plexities of  on-going closed loop agent-environment
interactions. Such interactions do, we admit, tend to in-
volve complex, continuous, reciprocal causal influences
(the agent is continuously affecting some aspect of  the
world while that aspect is, simultaneously, continuously
influencing the agent. . .) of  an analytically problematic
kind. But our story is explicitly focused on cases in which
cognitive processing proceeds outside of  any such
closed-loop routines.
4.  CONCLUSIONS: WHAT MAKES A
SCIENCE COGNITIVE?
Cognitive science, it may safely be presumed, is the sci-
ence (or sciences) whose object is the explanation and
understanding of  cognition. But what makes a phenom-
enon cognitive in the first place? We suggest that the
truly cognitive phenomena are those that involve off-
line reasoning, vicarious environmental exploration, and
the like. It is worth underlining the fact that this stance
places us somewhat at odds with an increasingly influ-
ential view that either rejects the idea of  a cognitive/
non-cognitive divide altogether or (more commonly)
expands the realm of  the cognitive to include all kinds
of  adaptively valuable organism/environment coupling
(Kelso, 1995, pp. 33-34; Thelen & Smith, 1994, pp. 311-
339). As two prominent theorists put it:
Cognitive processes span the brain, the body,
and the environment: to understand cogni-
tion is to understand the interplay of  all three.
Inner reasoning processes are no more essen-
tially cognitive that the skillful execution of
coordinated movement or the nature of  the
environment in which cognition takes place.
(van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. viii-ix)
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 We think this is just too liberal to be explanatorily
useful. Is not the notion of  a truly cognitive agent, at
root, the notion of  something like a reflective agent?
What is needed, we believe, is just a principled way to
make this idea (of  a reflective agent) precise and to purge
it of its original (but probably superficial) associations
with episodes of  conscious reflection. Our notion of
strong representation lets us do just this. Cognizers, on
our account, must display the capacity for environmen-
tally decoupled thought and the contemplation of op-
tions. The cognizer is thus the being who can think or
reason about its world without directly engaging those
aspects of  the world that its thoughts concern. This is
the essence of  the emulator example developed in Sec-
tion 1 and affords (we suggest) an intuitive yet reason-
ably precise means of  demarcating cognitive agency from
other (important) kinds of  adaptive response. Notice
however that this focus on decoupled reason can still
accommodate cases in which extra-neural apparatus and
structures are playing genuinely cognitive roles e.g., the
use of  pen and paper to create a kind of  extended emu-
lator circuit (Clark & Chalmers, 1997; Hutchins, 1995).
In thus suggesting a substantial demarcation within
the class of  adaptively potent mechanisms and ploys,
we do not mean to in any way disparage the large body
of  recent work focused on simpler kinds of  agent/en-
vironment interaction. In fact, we hold that fluent,
coupled real-world action-taking is a necessary compo-
nent of  cognition. The states of  the emulator circuit count
as representations in part because of  the way they can
feed into and affect the systems more basic engage-
ments with its world. Cognition, we want to say, requires
both fluent real-world coupling and the capacity to im-
prove such engagements by the use of  de-coupled, off-
line reasoning.
Two final points should establish the genuine dis-
tance between our view and more traditional and re-
strictive forms of  cognitivism and representationalism.
First, we recognize the adaptive niche and the real bio-
mechanics of  the organism to be crucial determinants
of  what kinds of  states of  affairs it may need to
(strongly) represent and of  how it should represent them.
Analog models of  egocentrically-specified aspects of
the agents own body and local surroundings are thus
perfectly compatible with our brand of  representation-
alism. Second, we do not advocate the focus on top
level cases (such as mental arithmetic, chess playing and
so on) that characterized early cognitivist research. The
motor emulation case was chosen precisely because it
displays one way in which the investigation of  quite
biologically basic, robotics-friendly problems can none-
theless phase directly into the investigation of  agents
that genuinely cognize their worlds. Such agents are able
to substitute inner dynamics for on-going environmen-
tal stimulation, and command adaptively valuable inner
spaces that they use to sculpt and modulate their more
direct engagements with the world. It is these Carte-
sian Agents, we believe, that must form the proper sub-
ject matter of  any truly cognitive robotics.
NOTES
1This section draws on material developed more fully
in Grush (1995, 1997).
2We are explicitly excluding reflexes, cyclic and auto-
matic movements, such as chewing and walking, from
the discussion. Such motor skills may be subserved
by mechanisms quite different than ones we discuss
here, such as central pattern generators, reflex arcs,
etc.
3Quantitatively, there looks to be a minimum of  at least
200ms, and perhaps as great as 500 ms, delay be-
tween onset (at the sensory periphery) of  the signal
and its actual use in regulating activity of  the arm.
This figure is established by, for example, using arti-
ficial vibrators strapped to the tendons to disrupt the
proprioceptive signal from the muscle spindles, and
timing the gap between such disruptive input and al-
terations to the arm motion itself  (see Denier van
der Gon, 1988; Redon et al., 1991). Yet fine-grained
alterations which correct variances in the initial part
of  a movement appear in normal reaching within the
first 70 milliseconds of  the action (van der Meulen et
al., 1990); (Grush, 1995).
4The emulators we describe here are quite simple. In
actual engineering applications, these emulators would
be a part of  a more sophisticated control structure,
such as a model-reference adaptive controller or a
Kalman filter (see, e.g., Wolpert et al., 1995). This
does not effect the points we make, however.
5The present discussion of  emulator circuitry is neces-
sarily quite short, but additional material filling out
the major claims can be found in the following pub-
lications: For evidence that proprioceptive feedback
is to slow to appropriately aid fast voluntary move-
ments (Denier van der Gon, 1988); (van der Meulen
et al., 1990). For models which use emulator circuitry
(also known as forward models) in order to solve this
problem, see Wolpert et al., 1995; Kawato, 1990. For
further discussion of  these issues, together with dis-
cussion of  their relation to imagery, both motor and
visual, see Grush 1995, 1997, in preparation.
6Interestingly, the authors who originally discovered and
published this data (Ghez, 1990); (Ghez & Vicario,
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1978) interpret the function of  these neurons quite
differently than we do. They see them as different
classes of  motor neurons, which just happen (for rea-
sons unexplained) to closely mimic the physical pa-
rameters. This interpretation and ours are not incom-
patible, however.
7Notice then, that our concern is not with whether the
systems display intrinsic intentionality or have real
thoughts or emotions. We intend merely to distin-
guish two ways of  supporting successful behavior;
one of  which involves de-coupleable inner stand-ins
while the other does not.
8As a matter of  record, one of  us, (Grush), is not sure
he agrees with this and is drawn to the stronger claim
that, in fact, strong representation is a necessary con-
dition for cognitive status.
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